Abstract. We prove that for all standard arboreal forcing notions P there is a counterexample for the implication "If A is determined, then A is P-measurable". Moreover, we investigate for which forcing notions this is extendible to "weakly P-measurable".
Introduction
The use of coding techniques is ubiquitous in the theory of Determinacy: we code countably many reals as one, finite sequences as natural numbers, and basic open sets as finite sequences.
A consequence of this fact is that many proofs using Determinacy don't look at the set under investigation but at some coded or decoded version. Since most of the literature on determinacy works with the assumption that a whole pointclass (which is normally respected by the coding) is determined, this is not a problem.
As soon as we drop the talk about pointclasses and move on to individual sets, we start getting into trouble:
If we ask whether a given determined set has nice properties (for example, the Baire property), we tend to get unpleasant answers: In general, determined sets can be as nasty as you want them to be. Determinacy is a very local property. This paper is part of a project trying to understand the actual consequences of determinacy better. The difference between pointwise and classwise views of determinacy is of importance for higher set theory (it is, e.g., one of the differences being homogeneously Suslin and being determined that the first property has pointwise consequences whereas the second has only classwise consequences), and the present author has used counterexamples like the ones constructed in this paper in 2000 Mathematics Subject Classification. 03E15 03E05 03E60 06A06. The author thanks the anonymous referee for critical comments on an earlier version that led to substantial changes in the second half of the paper and Philipp Rohde (Aachen) for critical proofreading.
[Lö01] to show that the usual proof of Turing determinacy will not work under the assumption of imperfect information determinacy.
The Baire property in the above example is just one of many regularity properties derived from forcing notions. The corresponding algebras and ideals have been investigated long before the advent of forcing in [Ma35] , and since then they have been the subject of a considerable amount of research. As a short reference list, we mention [Ell74] , [ LaRe95] , [ La96] , [Br95] , [Lö98] and [BrLö99] .
Among these forcing notions, we tend to distinguish between socalled "topological forcings" with the property that the forcing conditions form a topology base, and the "non-topological forcings".
In this paper, we shall look at the interplay between determinacy and the set algebras defined by those non-topological forcings. We shall show that for any given forcing notion P (subject to certain nontriviality restraints), it is not the case that any determined set A lies in the algebra of measurability defined by P. Furthermore, we look at the notion of weak P-measurability (which is classwise equivalent to P-measurability) and determine which forcing notions P allow us to construct counterexamples to pointwise implications from determinacy to weak P-measurability by a Bernstein construction.
Definitions and Standard Constructions
Since this paper is about distinguishing properties of single sets from properties of classes of sets, let's introduce a way of addressing this difference:
If Φ and Ψ are predicates of subsets of ω ω , we say that Φ follows pointwise from Ψ if for all sets A the implication "Ψ(A) → Φ(A)" holds. We say that Φ follows classwise from Ψ if for all boldface pointclasses Γ we have the following implication:
"if we have Ψ(A) for all A ∈ Γ, then we have Φ(A) for all A ∈ Γ" (where a boldface pointclass is a pointclass closed under continuous preimages; cf. [Mo80, pp. 19 & 27] ).
As we mentioned in the introduction, most of the work on determinacy and regularity properties focuses on classwise implications. We shall look at the fact that pointwise implications do not hold, i.e., we'll construct determined sets which don't have regularity properties.
Obviously, in order to construct sets which don't have regularity properties, we shall need the Axiom of Choice which will be assumed tacitly throughout this paper. This paper uses the standard notation and the standard definitions of set theory of the reals, [BaJu95] , Descriptive Set Theory [Mo80] and the theory of forcing [Ku80] . The reals are identified either with Baire space ω ω or with Cantor space 2 ω . In general, we look at spaces N ω where 2 ≤ N ≤ ω.
2.1. Arboreal Forcings. We look at (symmetric) regularity properties derived from arboreal forcing notions (as introduced in [Lö98] ). A forcing notion P is called arboreal on N if it is isomorphic to a family of pruned trees on N ordered by inclusion. This is equivalent to saying that the forcing conditions are closed sets in N ω . For each tree P we let [P ] be the set of all branches through P . For a finite sequence s ∈ ω <ω , we let [s] := {x ; s ⊆ x} be the set of all branches through the tree of all sequences compatible with s.
As usual in forcing, in most situations we shall assume that the forcing notions are nonatomic, i.e., that for each P ∈ P there are incompatible Q and R with Q ≤ P and R ≤ P . (This corresponds to the generic reals not belonging to the ground model, cf. [Ku80, Lemma VII.2.4].) Most of the forcings have an even stronger property: We call P strongly nonatomic if that for each P ∈ P there are Q and R with Q ≤ P and R ≤ P and
If we talk about arboreal forcing notions, we always keep in mind the standard examples from [Je86] , [BaJu95] , [Br95] , [Lö98] , and [BrLö99] : Cohen forcing C, Hechler forcing D, Eventually different forcing E, Sacks forcing S, Miller forcing M, Laver forcing L, Willowtree forcing W, Silver forcing V, Matet forcing T, and Mathias forcing R (the definitions can be found in the above mentioned papers and monographs; for E, check [BaJu95] , for W and T, check [Br95, Lö98] ). Among these, S, V and W are arboreal on 2, the others are arboreal on ω.
Let A be a subset of N ω and P an arboreal forcing on N . We call A weakly P-measurable if there is a P ∈ P such that either [P ] ⊆ A or [P ] ⊆ N ω \A. We call A P-measurable if for each Q ∈ P there is a P ≤ Q such that either [P ] ⊆ A or [P ] ⊆ N ω \A. Both P-measurability and weak P-measurability are symmetric concepts: If A is (weakly) P-measurable, then its complement is (weakly) P-measurable as well. It is clear that P-measurability implies weak P-measurability pointwise. Brendle and the present author show in [BrLö99, Lemma 2.1] that the converse holds classwise.
Two remarks are in order:
(1) These notions of measurability do not necessarily generate a σ-algebra. For this, we need some sort of fusion property (cf. [Je86, Definition I.3.6]) which holds for the mentioned standard examples. Since this is irrelevant for the investigation at hand, we shall not discuss it here.
(2) Some arboreal forcing notions P generate a topology, i.e., their conditions form a topology base. In this situation, we have a different candidate for a natural algebra defined by P: the σ-algebra of sets having the Baire property in the topology generated by P. More often than not, this algebra is more natural than the algebra of the P-measurable sets: Look at Cohen forcing where C-measurability translates into "for each open set there is an open subset contained in A or contained in the complement of A". Clearly, the set of rationals doesn't have this property. This means that the C-measurable sets do not form a σ-algebra, and they don't include all F σ sets.
In these cases (among our standard examples, this happens for C, D, E and R) we define the corresponding regularity property to be the Baire property associated to the topology. We will not deal with a situation like this in this paper.
2.2. Determinacy. If T is a tree on N and t ∈ T , we say that
• T doesn't split at t if t has exactly one immediate successor, • T fully splits at t if for all n ∈ N , t n ∈ T . A tree σ ⊆ N <ω is called a strategy for player I on N if it doesn't split at any node of even length, and fully splits at every node of odd length. A tree τ ⊆ N <ω is called a strategy for player II on N if it doesn't split at any node of odd length, and fully splits at every node of even length.
A set A is called determined if it contains the branches of a strategy σ for player I (i.e., [σ] ⊆ A, in that case, we call σ a winning strategy for player I) or its complement contains the branches of a strategy τ for player II (i.e., [τ ] ⊆ N ω \A, in that case, we call σ a winning strategy for player II).
A tree T on N will be called a substrategic I-tree (substrategic II-tree) if there is a strategy σ on N for player I (for player II) such that T is a perfect subtree of σ. We call T a substrategic tree if T is either a substrategic I-tree or a substrategic II-tree. The set of all substrategic trees (for a given N clear from the context) will be denoted by ssT. The sets of substrategic I-trees (II-trees) will be denoted by ssT I (ssT II ). Note that every strategy is a substrategic tree. If T is a substrategic I-tree there is a unique N T ∈ ω such that for all nonempty t ∈ T , we have t(0) = N T . If T is a substrategic II-tree, then for all n there either is a unique number M T,n such that for all t ∈ T with lh(t) ≥ 2 and t(0) = n we have t(1) = M T,n or n / ∈ T . In the latter case we let M T,n be undefined.
It is important to note that the numbers N T and M T,n are not changed by enlarging or shrinking the tree:
Proof: Obvious.
q.e.d.
A finite sequence s ∈ ω <ω is called compatible with a tree T if s ∈ T . If s is compatible with T , we call T ↑s := {t ∈ T ; t ⊆ s or s ⊆ t} the truncation of T at s. All truncations of strategies for player I (player II) are substrategic I-trees (substrategic II-trees).
If T is a substrategic I-tree and C ⊆ ω ω , we call C isolated from T if all elements of C differ from T in the first digit, i.e., if for all x ∈ C, we have x(0) = N T . If T is a substrategic II-tree and C ⊆ ω ω , we call C isolated from T if all elements of C differ from T in the second digit, i.e., if for all x ∈ C, we have that M T,x(0) is defined and x(1) = M T,x(0) . We introduce the notation Isol(C, T ) for "C is isolated from T ". contains a perfect set.
Proof: Part (i) follows from Observation 2.1 and the fact that being isolated from T only depends in N T or {M T,n ; n ∈ ω}.
As for (ii), since T is perfect, T ↑s is a perfect tree for s ∈ T \S, hence
The question whether determinacy implies P-measurability classwise has been dealt with in [Lö98] where the present author shows that there are games corresponding to the forcing notions whose determinacy gives the appropriate measurability. In most cases, these games use real moves, so the determinacy in the sense defined above may not be enough to get the wanted classwise implications. For a notion of P-measurability, having an integer game associated with it seems to be a strong property as the analysis of Zapletal [Za∞] suggests. This seems to be connected to the famous open problem whether the Axiom of Determinacy AD implies the Ramsey property for all sets of reals [Ka94, Question 27.18].
Measurability
If our question is whether determinacy implies measurability pointwise, we get the expected answer: "In all interesting cases, no."
We need a technical lemma which is just an abstract version of Bernstein's theorem:
Lemma 3.1 (General Bernstein Construction). Let κ be any infinite cardinal, A be any set, and S α ; α < κ be any sequence of sets such that for each α, the set S α \A has cardinality κ or greater. Then there are disjoint sets X and Y with
(
Proof :
The sets X and Y are constructed by recursion. In each step β, designate two elements x β and y β . Write X α := {x β ; β < α} and Y α := {y β ; β < α}. Both of these sets have α many elements (in particular, less than κ many). Consequently, the set S α \(A ∪ X α ∪ Y α ) has still cardinality κ, and we are allowed to pick two new elements x α and y α .
Finally, set X := α<κ X α and
Theorem 3.2. If P is an arboreal forcing such that [P ] has cardinality continuum for all P ∈ P, then determinacy does not imply Pmeasurability pointwise.
Proof : We claim the following: There are a strategy σ and a P-condition Q such that for all P ≤ Q, the set [P ]\[σ] has cardinality continuum.
Proof of Claim: Suppose that τ and Q ∈ P are such that the cardinality of [ We fix σ and Q as in the Claim. Let P α ; α < 2 ℵ 0 be an enumeration of the set {P ; P ≤ Q}. We can apply Lemma 3.1 to [σ] and [P α ] ; α < 2 ℵ 0 in order to get Bernstein components X and Y . Now let B := [σ] ∪ X. Then Q witnesses that neither B nor N ω \B is P-measurable: every condition below Q has a branch through both B and its complement.
But if σ was a strategy for player I, then B is determined. If, on the other hand, σ was a strategy for player II, the complement of B is determined.
Corollary 3.3. For all mentioned non-topological forcing notions P (S, M, L, W, V, T), determinacy does not imply P-measurability pointwise.
Proof : All mentioned forcings are strongly nonatomic and all strongly nonatomic forcings have perfect sets as conditions. Thus the result follows from Theorem 3.2.
Weak Measurability
The situation for weak P-measurability is much more complicated and there are not always counterexamples to pointwise implications.
So we have to be careful, and our of means of classifying forcings is a measure called fatness. We shall be able to show that we have definitive answers for fatness zero and uncountable fatness and that all classical examples of arboreal forcing notions have one of these two values.
The situation of other values of fatness is more subtle, and we shall give examples of (not too natural) forcing notions that show that for finite or countable fatness the relationship between determinacy and weak measurability is unclear.
Fix any κ ≤ 2 ℵ 0 . We call an forcing notion P that is arboreal on N κ-fat if there is a strategy σ on N such that for all P ∈ P the set [P ]\[σ] has cardinality at least κ.
We shall now define the notion of fatness:
• We say that P has fatness n for some natural number n if P is n-fat but not n + 1-fat.
• We say that P has fatness < ℵ 0 if P is n-fat for all natural numbers n but not ℵ 0 -fat.
• We say that P has countable fatness if P is ℵ 0 -fat but not ℵ 1 -fat.
• We say that P has uncountable fatness if P is ℵ 1 -fat. The conspicuous gap (we don't distinguish between different uncountable values of fatness) is easily explained: Proposition 4.1. If P has uncountable fatness, then it is 2 ℵ 0 -fat.
Proof : Suppose P is ℵ 1 -fat as witnessed by a strategy σ. Then the sets [P ]\[σ] are uncountable for all P ∈ P. But both [P ] and [σ] are closed sets, so their difference is Borel. By Hausdorff's theorem [Ke94, Theorem (13.6)] every uncountable Borel set contains a perfect set, so all of these sets are actually of cardinality continuum. Consequently, σ witnesses that P is 2 ℵ 0 -fat. q.e.d.
As we anticipated, forcings with fatness zero or uncountable fatness can be handled quite easily. Before we prove this, let us note that all natural forcing notions seem to have either fatness zero or uncountable fatness: . Since we didn't give the definitions of the forcings, it doesn't make sense to go into details here. We leave it to the reader to play around with those combinatorial objects (which is not too hard).
The most common values zero and continuum are easy to handle:
Proposition 4.3. If P has fatness zero, then weak P-measurability follows pointwise from determinacy.
Proof: Having fatness zero means in particular that P is not 1-fat, so for all strategies σ there is a P-condition P σ whose branches are completely contained in [σ] .
Hence any determined A is weakly P-measurable. q.e.d.
Theorem 4.4. If P has uncountable fatness, weak P-measurability does not follow pointwise from determinacy.
Proof :
We have to construct a determined set which is not weakly P-measurable:
By Proposition 4.1, P is 2 ℵ 0 -fat, i.e., there is a strategy σ with the property that for all P ∈ P, [P ]\[σ] still contains 2 ℵ 0 reals. We now apply Lemma 3.1 to [σ] and the sequence [P α ] ; α < 2 ℵ 0 of P-conditions. Let X and Y be Bernstein components.
Finally, let B := [σ] ∪ X. Clearly, B cannot contain the branches through an element of P as witnessed by Y . But X witnesses that the complement of B cannot contain the branches through an element of P. Consequently, neither B nor its complement are weakly P-measurable. But if σ is a strategy for player I, then B is determined, and if σ was a strategy for player II, the complement of B is determined.
Corollary 4.5. Weak Sacks measurability and weak Miller measurability follow pointwise from determinacy. This is not true for weak Laver, Willowtree, Silver or Matet measurability.
Proof : This is now clear from Observation 4.2, Proposition 4.3 and Theorem 4.4.
Finite and countable fatness: Pointwise Implications
Proposition 4.3 and Theorem 4.4 settle the cases of fatness zero and of uncountable fatness.
This leaves the cases of fatness n (for n > 0), of fatness < ℵ 0 and of countable fatness. As we mentioned, these cases are less interesting, since all canonical examples have either fatness 0 or uncountable fatness. As it turns out, in all three mentioned cases, we do get nonstructure results, and generic forcings with these values of fatness tend to be somewhat odd. It would be interesting to ask whether there are any natural examples of forcings with these values of fatness, or -in contrast-whether we can find a natural property of forcings (that all forcings used in applications share) that implies that the fatness of all forcings with this property is either zero or uncountable.
Although at the moment, we don't have a candidate for such a property, we can show that strong nonatomicity excludes two of the problematic values for fatness:
Proposition 5.1. If P is strongly nonatomic and P is not ℵ 0 -fat, then P has fatness zero.
Proof: Take some n such that P is n-fat and a strategy σ witnessing this. Towards a contradiction, assume that n > 0. Since P is not ℵ 0 -fat, there must be some P ∈ P such that S := [P ]\[σ] is finite, say it has k elements.
We can use the strong nonatomicity to split P into subconditions {P i ; i < k + 1} such that the sets [P i ] are pairwise disjoint. Since σ was witnessing that P is n-fat, each S ∩ [P i ] must contain at least n elements. So, Card(S) ≥ n · (k + 1), and since n > 0, this contradicts Card(S) = k.
Let us look at canonical examples for forcings of finite and countable fatness. All trees will be trees on ω from now on.
For the case of forcings with fatness < ℵ 0 we need to fix a partition of the substrategic I-trees by defining χ(T ) := N T + 1. If T is a substrategic II-tree, we set χ(T ) = 1. Note that this function has the property that if T ⊆ T * , then χ(T ) = χ(T * ) by Observation 2.1. We define
In this definition, rk CB denotes the Cantor-Bendixson rank function. rk CB (S) = 0 means that S has no limit points. In particular, S is closed.
Theorem 5.2. G n is a nonatomic forcing notion of fatness n. Determinacy implies weak G n -measurability pointwise.
Proof: (1) Let's first show the nonatomicity: We take any P := [T ] ∪ S for T ∈ ssT. Since T is a perfect tree, we find proper perfect subtrees T 0 and T 1 . Now P 0 := [T 0 ] ∪ S and P 1 := [T 1 ] ∪ S witness nonatomicity.
(2) It is clear that G n is not n + 1-fat, since for every strategy σ and every set S isolated from σ and with n distinct elements, the set P := [σ] ∪ S is a condition, and S = P \[σ] has n elements.
(3) For every strategy σ and every P ∈ G n , the set P \[σ] has at least n elements: Let P = [T ] ∪ S where T ∈ ssT.
If T is a subtree of σ, then S is isolated from σ by Observation 2.2 (i). So, P \[σ] = S.
If T is not a subtree of σ, then by Observation 2.
Thus, G n is n-fat. (4) Suppose that A is determined but not weakly G n -measurable. Case A: There is a strategy σ for player I such that [σ] ⊆ A. With any set of pairwise distinct elements {x 1 , . . . , x n } such that x i (0) = N σ , we can construct a G n condition P := [σ] ∪ {x 1 , . . . , x n }. Thus (we are assuming that A doesn't contain a condition) A cannot contain n such elements. But this means that there is an infinite set of natural numbers M such that A ∩ [ m ] = ∅ for all m ∈ M . Now pick n + 1 distinct elements {k 0 , . . . , k n } from M . Take any strategy σ * for player I with N σ * = k 0 and any elements {x 1 , . . . , x n } with We look at all sequences of length two. Of these infinitely many are not in τ . Any element of ω ω starting with one of these is isolated from τ , so ω ω \A cannot contain n pairwise distinct elements starting with one of those. That means there are infinitely many sequences s of length two such that ω ω \A ∩ [s] = ∅. Take n + 1 sequences {s 0 , . . . , s n } like this, find a substrategic tree T such that [T ] ⊆ [s 0 ] and elements {x 1 , . . . , x n } with
Theorem 5.3. G <ℵ 0 is a nonatomic forcing notion of fatness < ℵ 0 . Determinacy implies weak G <ℵ 0 -measurability pointwise.
Proof: The proof is close to the proof of Theorem 5.2 and we use the numbering (1) to (4) from there. The proof of nonatomicity (1) is the same.
(2) It is clear that G <ℵ 0 is not ℵ 0 -fat. If we take any strategy σ and a set S of χ(σ) many points isolated from σ, then P := [σ] ∪ S is a condition, and S = P \[σ] has χ(σ) (i.e., finitely) many points.
(3) We shall now show that G <ℵ 0 is n-fat for every natural number n. We fix a strategy σ for player I with χ(σ) = n. Then the proof of (3) in Theorem 5.2 shows that σ witnesses that G <ℵ 0 is n-fat. (1) In this case, the forcing is strongly nonatomic, since we can split up every infinite internally isolated set into two infinite internally isolated disjoint sets. (This is where we need rk CB (S) = 0. Note that we are essentially using that G ℵ 0 lives on ω-in the space N ω for N < ω there is no infinite set with rk CB (S) = 0 due to König's Lemma and the pigeon hole principle.)
(2) The forcing is clearly not ℵ 1 -fat, since for each strategy σ there is a countable internally isolated set S that is isolated from σ, hence P := [σ] ∪ S is a condition, and S = P \[σ] is countable.
(3) The proof that G ℵ 0 is ℵ 0 -fat follows exactly the corresponding proof for G n in Theorem 5.2.
(4) Proving that weak G ℵ 0 -measurability follows pointwise from determinacy also is exactly as in the proof of Theorem 5.2. If we assume that A is determined but not weakly G ℵ 0 -measurable, A must be disjoint from infinitely many basic open sets generated by sequences of length one or two (depending on which player wins the game on A). Use these to construct a condition that witnesses weak G ℵ 0 -measurability. q.e.d.
Finite and countable fatness: Pointwise Non-implications
We will now modify the canonical examples of Section 5 to get examples for pointwise non-implications. It is interesting to see that our examples do not use the Bernstein construction and thus do not use the Axiom of Choice.
In addition to the isolation properties defined in Section 2.2 we define a notion of being properly isolated:
Each tree T has a leftmost bit:
T := min{t(0) ; t ∈ T }.
Proposition 6.3. Let n > 0. Then A is a determined set which is not weakly G * n -, G * <ℵ 0 -, or G * ℵ 0 -measurable.
Proof: Any condition P (for all of the three forcings) has the property that there are x, y ∈ P with y(0) = x(0) + 1. (This is where we need n > 0; note that the definition of χ makes sure that the additional set S is never empty.) But clearly, neither A nor ω ω \A can contain such a set.
Corollary 6.4. For P ∈ {G * n , G * <ℵ 0
, G * ℵ 0 }, determinacy does not imply weak P-measurability pointwise.
Proof: Obvious from Proposition 6.3.
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